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We argue that the existing regret matchings for equilibrium approximation lead to “jumpy” strategy updating when the
probabilities of future plays are set to be proportional to positive regret measures. We propose a geometrical regret
matching which has a “smooth” strategy updating. Our approach is simple, intuitive and natural. The analytical and
numerical results show that, continuously and “smoothly” suppressing “unprofitable” pure strategies is sufficient for the
game to evolve towards equilibrium, suggesting that in reality the tendency could be pervasive and irresistible. Techni-
cally, iterative regret matching gives rise to a sequence of adjusted mixed strategies for our study its approximation to
the true equilibrium point. The sequence can be analyzed in metric space and visualized nicely as a clear path towards
an equilibrium point. Our theory has limitations in optimizing the approximation accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2000 Hart and Mas-Colell proposed an iterative algo-
rithm called regret matching to approximate an equilibrium1,2.
The players keep tracking the regrets of their own past plays
and make the future plays with probabilities proportional to
positive regret measures. This algorithm is particularly nat-
ural in that the players don’t have to know their opponents’
payoff functions, as opposed to the non-adaptive variety, e.g.
the celebrated Lemke-Howson algorithm3,4 which takes two
players’ payoff matrices as input and pinpoints equilibrium
points as output. In other words, regret matching allows the
players to reach equilibrium without strict mediation from be-
yond themselves. The concept of regret matching has since
been adopted and developed by other algorithms5.
Iterative regret matching can be seen as continuous updat-
ing of mixed strategy with regret information: the mixed strat-
egy to update is statistical structure of the whole past plays,
and the mixed strategy updated will determine the probabil-
ities of plays in the immediate future. Regret matching is
essentially a function between them. In general the existing
regret-matching functions update the mixed strategy propor-
tional to positive regret measures, meaning that each match-
ing is a “strategy jump” and the past mixed strategy has little
relevance except for it being used for regret evaluation. In this
paper, we try to propose a “smoother” regret matching with
more respect to the past plays. Partly inspired by the map-
ping T in Nash’s existential proof of equilibrium point6, our
function for regret matching takes the form of
s′i =
si+ riRi,S(si)
1+ ri
∣∣Ri,S(si)∣∣ , where ri > 0.
As shown in FIG 1 our regret-matching function can be in-
terpreted geometrically if we treat mixed strategies and re-
grets on pure strategies both as vectors: each regret matching
will “push” mixed strategy vector towards regret vector by a
small angle, and the smaller ri is the “smoother” matching will
be. Other than the smoothness for strategy updating, more
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importantly our regret matching agrees well with the behav-
ioral tendency of immediate suppressing “unprofitable” pure
strategies, which makes the matching a natural one. Our re-
gret matching turns out to have clear analytical results for re-
gret minimization. The test results in FIG 2, 3 and 4 show
that, the matching delivers strong numerical convergence to
Nash equilibrium both for two-person and many-person non-
cooperative games. And as shown in FIG 5, the convergence is
independent of the initial mixed strategies to start game with.
Figure 1: An example for the geometrical relation of mixed
strategy si, regret vector Ri(si) and regret-matched s′i. The dotted
line represents the simplex in R2. In this example regret vector
Ri(si) must be to the direction of one vertex since the other one is
“less profitable than average” such that the corresponding regret
component in vector Ri(si) is zero.
The remainder of paper goes as follows. In Section II, we
vectorize the key concepts of non-cooperative game as well as
regret measures in preparation of Section III, where our regret
matching is elaborated and applied directly upon mixed strate-
gies so as to approximate a Nash equilibrium point. In Sec-
tion IV, the approximation algorithm is verified with the ex-
amples both of two-person game and general n-person game,
and their “strategy paths" are visualized as shown in FIG 2–5.
In Section V, we address the accuracy issues of equilibrium
approximation. In Section VI, we consider some generaliza-
tions for our theory.
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2Figure 2: The pair of “strategy paths” on the simplex of R3 for a
two-person game. The game has the code name 3X3-1eq2sp to
refer to, indicating that the game has one single equilibrium point
and either player can use three pure strategies.
Figure 3: The pair of “strategy paths” for a two-person game
where two players use 60 and 40 pure strategies respectively. The
60 or 40 dimensions of “strategy path” data are reduced with PCA
to three dimensions for the visualization in R3 .
II. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME AND REGRET
In this section, we will define the condition of Nash equi-
librium as well as the regret measures in the form of vector
and its L1-norm.
First of all, let us define the familiar concepts of non-
cooperative game and set up their notations.
Figure 4: The “strategy paths” for a six-person game, where each
player can use three pure strategies.
Figure 5: The equilibrium point of game 3X3-1eq2sp is an
“attractor” for all possible “strategy paths”.
• There are n players, and each player i has gi pure strate-
gies. The ith player’s jth pure strategy is denoted by pii j.
• The mixed strategy si of each player i is a point of a
probability simplex Ii, which is a compact and convex
subset of the real vector space Rgi of gi dimensions.
That is, si∈Ii⊂Rgi .
• Each player i has a payoff function p¯i : S→R. Any S∈S
is an n-tuple of mixed strategies, e.g. (s1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sn)
in which each item si is associated with the ith player
such that si∈Ii. Therefore, S is the product of all n play-
ers’ simplices, i.e. I1×I2×·· ·×In.
3• Any player i can, from the given S∈S, form a new n-
tuple of mixed strategies, denoted by si;S∈S, by unilat-
erally substituting the ith item of S with its new mixed
strategy si, or as a special case, pii j;S∈S by unilater-
ally substituting with its jth pure strategy. Obviously,
si;S=S if S already uses si.
Intendedly, these vector-centric definitions and notations al-
low us to, for any player i=1,2, . . .,n, translate the linearity of
its payoff p¯i(S) in si into p¯i(S)=〈si,vi〉. Here 〈·, ·〉 is the inner
product of vectors, si is the mixed strategy player i uses in S
and vi is the player’s payoff vector for the gi vertices of its
simplex Ii. Given any n-tuple S∈S, for each player i we have
vi,S =
(
p¯i(pii1;S), . . . , p¯i(pii j;S), . . . , p¯i(piigi ;S)
)
. (1)
Given any S, each player can substitute its item in S with
si∈Ii to form a new one si;S∈S, which means that we can
designate for each player i a variant payoff function pi,S of
substitute strategy si:
pi,S(si) = p¯i(si;S)=〈si,vi,S〉. (2)
Note that pi,S(si) is the expected value of payoff or sim-
ply the average payoff, since si can be conveniently treated as
probability distribution. From Eq. (1) and (2) we can derive
for each player i a function
Ri,S(si) =
(
ϕi1,S(si), . . . ,ϕi j,S(si), . . . ,ϕigi,S(si)
)
. (3)
Here each component of vector Ri,S(si) is defined by the
very function proposed by Nash in his existential proof:
ϕi j,S(si) = max
{
0, p¯i(pii j;S)−pi,S(si)
}
. (4)
Each component ϕi j,S(si) represents the payoff gain for
player i when its strategy moves from mixed si to its jth pure
strategy. We say a pure strategy is “more profitable” than si
if its ϕi j,S(si)>0 or otherwise “less (or equally) profitable”.
Vector Ri,S(si) has at least one zero component, since there
must be one “least profitable” pure strategy as implied by the
linearity of pi,S(si) in si.
Given S, vector Ri,S(si) measures, in terms of payoff, how
far a substitute si is from the optimal one. Specifically, the
L1-norm of Ri,S(si), i.e.
∣∣Ri,S(si)∣∣=∑gij ϕi j,S(si), decreases as
pi,S(si) increases and would turn zero when pi,S(si) is maxi-
mized with the optimal substitute. Recall that an equilibrium
point is an n-tuple S in which each player’s mixed strategy is
optimal against those of its opponents6. That is, an n-tuple
S+∈S is an equilibrium point, if and only if Ri,S+(s+i )=0 or
equivalently
∣∣Ri,S+(s+i )∣∣=0 for each item s+i in S+.
Vector Ri,S(si) will be the focal point of our study. We call
Ri,S(si) the regret vector of player i in that the vector indicates
how much payoff it would have gained if its strategy moved
to the vertices of its simplex Ii, and correspondingly
∣∣Ri,S(si)∣∣
the regret sum of player i. We shall occasionally abbreviate
equilibrium point by EqPt, and write pi(si), ϕi j(si) and Ri(si)
as implicitly indexed by given S.
III. REGRET MATCHING AND FIXED POINT ITERATION
In this section, we will conduct regret matching with regret
vector iteratively on the initial mixed strategies to approxi-
mate a Nash equilibrium. Ideally, this iterative regret match-
ing could develop into a fixed point iteration7.
We define each player’s regret matching to be a function
Ri,S : Ii→Ii:
ψi,S(si) =
si+ riRi,S(si)
1+ ri
∣∣Ri,S(si)∣∣ . (5)
Here ri>0. By s′i=ψi,S(si) we translate that, on the game
with given n-tuple S, if the player i unilaterally changes its
mixed strategy to any other si, it will regret that s′i should have
been used instead. We write ψi(si) occasionally. Our design
of ψi for regret matching has three important aspects to con-
sider.
First, function ψi has a geometrical interpretation.
We can see in FIG 1 that vector s′i is “closer” to vector Ri(si)
than vector si is. Generally, the “closeness” of two vectors, say
u and w, can be measured by their angle ∠(u,w), which fur-
ther can be measured by cos∠(u,w)= 〈u,w〉‖u‖‖w‖ . By Theorem 1,
we have cos∠(si+riRi(si),Ri(si))≥cos∠(si,Ri(si)) and thus
cos∠(s′i,Ri(si))≥ cos∠(si,Ri(si)). (6)
Theorem 1. For any non-zero real vectors u, w and u+rw
where real r>0, cos∠(u+rw,w)≥cos∠(u,w).
Proof. By definition, we have cos∠(u+rw,w)= 〈u+rw,w〉‖u+rw‖‖w‖
and cos∠(u,w)= 〈u,w〉‖u‖‖w‖ to compare. There are three cases
to consider with respect to 〈u+rw,w〉, as follows:
(i) If 〈u+rw,w〉>0, by the triangle inequality we have
cos∠(u+ rw,w) = 〈u+ rw,w〉‖u+ rw‖‖w‖ ≥
〈u+ rw,w〉
(‖u‖+‖rw‖)‖w‖
=
〈u,w〉
‖u‖‖w‖ +
r‖w‖
‖u‖+ r‖w‖
(
1− 〈u,w〉‖u‖‖w‖
)
≥ 〈u,w〉‖u‖‖w‖ = cos∠(u,w). (7)
(ii) If 〈u+rw,w〉=0, 〈u+rw,w〉=〈u,w〉+r‖w‖2=0 such that
cos∠(u,w)<0=cos∠(u+rw,w).
(iii) If 〈u+rw,w〉<0, 〈u,w〉<−r‖w‖2<0. Let u′=u+rw
and w′=−w. Because 〈u′+ rw′,w′〉=−〈u,w〉>0, as
with case (i) we have cos∠(u′+rw′,w′)>cos∠(u′,w′) and
thus cos∠(u,−w)>cos∠(u+rw,−w), which easily gives
cos∠(u,w)<cos∠(u+rw,w).
Second, function ψi has a behavioral interpretation.
By comparing vectors si and s′i component-wise, there must
be less proportion of pure strategy pii j used in si than in s′i, if
its corresponding component ϕi j(si) in vector Ri(si) is zero.
In other words, ψi preferably suppresses the use of “less prof-
itable than average” pure strategies and meantime enhances
4the use of some of the “more profitable than average” ones.
Note that this behavioral aspect was mentioned in Nash’s ex-
istential proof.
Third, s′i gives more payoff and less regret than si.
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 show that s′i will always be a
better choice in terms of payoff and regret sum, no matter what
si the player unilaterally changes its mixed strategy to, unless
si itself is optimal.
Theorem 2. For any S∈S and si∈Ii, pi,S(s′i)≥pi,S(si) where
s′i=ψi,S(si).
Proof. By Eq. (2) we know pi(s′i)=〈ψi(si),vi〉 where vi is the
player i’s vertex payoff vector as in Eq. (1). Then by Eq. (5)
we have,
pi(s′i) =
〈 si+ riRi(si)
1+ ri
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣ ,vi
〉
=
1
1+ ri
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣
(
〈si,vi〉+ ri〈Ri(si),vi〉
)
= 〈si,vi〉+
〈Ri(si),vi〉−〈si,vi〉
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣
r−1i +
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣ . (8)
Also by Eq. (2) we have 〈si,vi〉=pi(si). And
〈Ri(si),vi〉−〈si,vi〉
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣
=
gi
∑
j
ϕi j(si)p¯i(pii j;S)−
gi
∑
j
pi(si)ϕi j(si)
=
gi
∑
j
ϕi j(si)
(
p¯i(pii j;S)− pi(si)
)
=
gi
∑
j
ϕi j(si)ϕi j(si) = ‖Ri(si)‖2. (9)
Here ‖·‖ is L2-norm of vector. Finally because ‖Ri(si)‖2≥0
and r−1i +
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣≥r−1i >0, we have
pi(s′i) = pi(si)+
‖Ri(si)‖2
r−1i +
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣ ≥ pi(si). (10)
And pi(s′i)=pi(si) if and only if
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣=0.
Theorem 3. For any S∈S and si∈Ii,
∣∣Ri,S(s′i)∣∣≤∣∣Ri,S(si)∣∣
where s′i=ψi,S(si).
Proof. For each component ϕi j(s) in vector Ri(s) and its coun-
terpart ϕi j(s′i) in vector Ri(s′i), by Eq. (4) and Theorem 2 we
have ϕi j(s)≥ϕi j(s′i) such that ∑gij ϕi j(s′i)≤∑gij ϕi j(si).
These three aspects makes function ψi a natural regret
matching of mixed strategies: if a player i unilaterally and
continuously adjusts its strategy by ψi, intuitively its strategy
will keep “pushing” towards regret vector as target, the use
of “unprofitable” pure strategies will keep dropping, and most
importantly its payoff will monotonically increase and regret
sum will monotonically decrease. Since a player’s payoff is
bounded, continuous strategy adjustment by ψi would prefer-
ably lead to the optimal mixed strategy with maximum payoff
and zero regret sum.
The rest of this section considers all players adjusting their
strategies simultaneously and continuously.
On the game with given S, if all n players simultaneously
adjust strategies by their own ψi, there will form a new S′. Let
S′=Ψ(S) and we have
Ψ(S) =
(
ψ1,S(s1), . . . ,ψi,S(si), . . . ,ψn,S(sn)
)
. (11)
Note that Ψ(S)∈S for any S∈S because ψi(si)∈Ii for any
si∈Ii. And all players’ continuous strategy adjustment can be
described by an iterated function Ψ◦Ψ◦· · ·◦Ψ(S), denoted by
Ψt(S) with t∈N being the times of iterations. Given S=S0,
those iterated functions Ψt(S) with t=0,1,2, . . . give rise to
an infinite sequence of points in S for our study:
S0 =Ψ0(S0),
S1 =Ψ1(S0) =Ψ(S0),
S2 =Ψ2(S0) =Ψ(S1),
· · ·
St =Ψt(S0) =Ψ(St−1), (12)
· · ·
Here Ψ0 denotes the identity function. This sequence is re-
ferred to as (St)N implicitly indexed by S0 and Ψ. In fact,
the tuple [Ψ,S0] uniquely determines a sequence (St)N; we
say [Ψ,S0] generates (St)N. Sequence (St)N describes an infi-
nite dynamics of players adjusting their strategies in parallel.
Specifically, at the t th iteration, each player i adjusts its strat-
egy by substituting si in St−1 with ψi(si) so as to collectively
form a new n-tuple St=Ψ(St−1); at the (t+1)th iteration St+1
is formed by adjusting St in the same manner; and so forth.
Now we might hope that each and every player still has
its payoff monotonically increase and its regret sum mono-
tonically decrease in the process of simultaneous strategy
adjustment. In that case, the infinite sequence (St)N must
tend towards an EqPt. Moreover, it would be ideal if the
overall regret sum of all players, i.e. ∑ni
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣, converged
to zero along (St)N such that lim∞∑ni
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣(t)=0 and thus
lim∞
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣(t)=0 for each player i. In that case, by def-
inition lim∞St must be an EqPt. Denote it by S+ and
we must have Ψ(S+)=S+. Therefore, EqPt S+= lim∞St
is also a fixed point8 of function Ψ; the sequence (St)N
generated by [Ψ,S0] is essentially an outcome of the pro-
cess of fixed point iteration, which can be formulated to
lim∞Ψ◦Ψ◦· · ·◦Ψ(S0)= lim∞Ψt(S0)=S+. For our purpose we
assume that, with proper finite iterations, S∗=St=Ψt(S0) can
be a reasonable approximate of the true EqPt S+ such that
S∗≈S+, and the accuracy of such EqPt approximation can be
measured by the overall regret sum of all players.
Only this hope comes with huge caveat. As it turns out
in Section V, the presumption on the monotonicity of payoff
5and regret sum for all players along (St)N oftentimes doesn’t
hold true. Instead, due to simultaneous strategy adjustment
each player’s regret sum might fluctuate along (St)N with a
tendency to diminish towards zero. Nevertheless, we will see
that this tendency can still serve the purpose of approximat-
ing an EqPt. Notice that in FIG 1, the parameter ri in Eq.
(5) determines the rate of angle by which vector si and regret
vector Ri(si) “close up”. Here we call ri adjustment rate. To
counter the influence from simultaneous strategy adjustment,
as we will see in next section “infinitesimal” adjustment rates
are used for all players, in the hope that each player’s strategy
adjustment could be treated as negligible by its opponents and
thus their simultaneous strategy adjustment could be treated
as approximately unilateral.
We should visualize the sequence (St)N of Eq. (12) as
players’ perpetual searching for the equilibrium point of non-
cooperative game. In this searching, players don’t have to be
aware of the equilibrium point per se. Instead, each player is
constantly chasing after its regret vector Ri(si) in the hope of
reducing its regret sum
∣∣Ri(si)∣∣ to zero. Increasing payoff and
meantime reducing regret sum is the players’ sole incentive
and purpose, and regret vector is the players’ sole informa-
tion and target for their strategies adjustment. Regret vector
is dynamic along iterations, of course. At any iteration, given
the current mixed strategies of its opponents, each player can
calculate its regret vector by evaluating the payoff on its pure
strategies without any across-iteration retrospective consider-
ations. In this searching, there is no place for the mediator
beyond players; no inter-player information exchange other
than the current use of mixed strategies.
IV. GAME EXAMPLES AND VISUALIZATIONS
In this section we will verify our approach of EqPt approxi-
mation proposed in last section. Examples of both two-person
game and general n-person game will be tested, although the
former ones are our main consideration due to their simplic-
ity and sufficiency in revealing the important aspects of EqPt
approximation.
For the two-person game we have n=2 players, say the
row player with k pure strategies and the column player with
m pure strategies. Accordingly, the n-tuple S is special-
ized to two-tuple (s1×kr ,s1×mc ) of vectors, and thus the tuple
[Ψ,S0] is specialized to [(A,B),(rr,rc),(sr,sc)0] since func-
tion Ψ is determined by the two players’ payoff matrices
(Ak×m,Bk×m) and their adjustment rates (rr,rc). Recall that
given any S0∈S the tuple [Ψ,S0] generates an infinite se-
quence (St)N correspondingly. Then we can implement the
fixed point iteration in last section to Algorithm 11, which
takes [(A,B),(rr,rc),(sr,sc)0] as input, and for our study out-
puts an approximate EqPt (sr,sc)∗ as S∗ and its regret sum
(Rr,Rc)∗, a finite sequence
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T in correspondence to
(St)N, and a finite sequence
(
(Rr,Rc)t
)
T of regret sum. In Al-
1 Source code and demos can be found at https://github.com/lansiz/eqpt.
gorithm 1, the max operation compares vectors component-
wise as opposed to Eq. (4). Obviously, given T the com-
putational complexity of Algorithm 1 is under O(g2) with
g=max{k,m}.
Algorithm 1 EqPt approximation of two-person game.
Input: payoff bimatrix (Ak×m,Bk×m), adjustment rates (rr,rc), ini-
tial two-tuple of mixed strategies (s1×kr ,s1×mc ) and iterations T .
Output: approximate EqPt (sr,sc)∗ and its regret sum (Rr,Rc)∗; se-
quence
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T ; sequence
(
(Rr,Rc)t
)
T .
1: for t=1 to T do
2: vertices payoff: vr = Asᵀc , vc = Bᵀsᵀr .
3: payoff: pr = srvr, pc = scvc.
4: regret vector: Rr=max{0,vr−pr}, Rc=max{0,vc−pc}.
5: regret sum: Rr=
∣∣Rr∣∣, Rc=∣∣Rc∣∣.
6: if overall regret sum Rr+Rc is a new minimum then
7: update (sr,sc)∗ with (sr,sc).
8: update (Rr,Rc)∗ with (Rr,Rc).
9: endif
10: append (sr,sc) into its sequence.
11: append (Rr,Rc) into its sequence.
12: adjust mixed strategies: sr= sr+rrRr1+rrRr , sc=
sc+rcRc
1+rcRc .
13: end for
Given the output of Algorithm 1, we can plot the true EqPt
(sr,sc)+, the approximate EqPt (sr,sc)∗ and the sequence(
(sr,sc)t
)
T on R
2 or R3 to provide an intuitive visualization
of
(
(sr,sc)t
)
N approximating EqPt. Specifically, for the 3×3
two-person games with k=3 and m=3, we split
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T
into two sequences of (st)T , and then transform each into a
sequence of
(
(x,y)t
)
T for plotting on R
2 plane by defining
(x,y)t = st
 0 0√2
2
√
6
2√
2 0
 . (13)
Note that Eq. (13) transforms the simplex in R3 into a sub-
set of R2 enclosed by an equilateral triangle. The following
are our observations on the test results of four typical 3×3
games:
• Game 3X3-1eq1sp has one unique EqPt, which uses
one single pure strategy. As shown in FIG 6,
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T
converges straight towards the EqPt.
• Game 3X3-1eq2sp has one unique EqPt, which uses
two pure strategies. As shown in FIG 2,
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T
converge towards the EqPt with oscillation.
• Game 3X3-2eq2sp has two EqPts, each of which uses
two pure strategies. As shown in FIG 7,
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T
converges with oscillation towards one of the two EqPts
dependent on the initial strategies.
• Game 3X3-1eq3sp has one unique EqPt, which uses
three pure strategies. As shown in FIG 8,
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T
doesn’t converge towards the EqPt but develops into a
seemingly perfect circle away from the true EqPt. The
last position of
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T could be any point in the
circle.
6Figure 6: The “strategy paths” on the simplex of R3 for game
3X3-1eq1sp. The two black crosses combine to represent the true
EqPt. The input and output of game are annotated.
Figure 7: The “strategy paths” for game 3X3-2eq2sp. The
approximate EqPt annotated corresponds to the true EqPt at the base
line of equilateral triangle.
And for the general two-person games with k>3 and m>3,
we split
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T into two sequences of (st)T , and then
with PCA (Principal Component Analysis for dimension re-
duction9) transform each into a sequence of
(
(x,y,z)t
)
T for
plotting in R3 space. The following are our observations on
the test results of two typical 60×40 games:
• FIG 3 shows a 60×40 game whose ((sr,sc)t)T con-
verges towards an EqPt.
• FIG 9 shows a 60×40 game whose ((sr,sc)t)T develops
Figure 8: The “strategy paths” for game 3X3-1eq3sp.
Figure 9: The “strategy paths” for a 60×40 game. The blue and
red dots represent the last positions of strategies.
into a perfect circle.
For the two-person game, its EqPts are determined by the
bimatrix (A,B), independent of the initial (sr,sc)0. Then for
the 3×3 game examples mentioned previously, we test them
with many random (sr,sc)0 and observe that there appear to
be two kinds of EqPts, “attractor” EqPt and “repellor” EqPt,
as follows:
• For game 3X3-1eq2sp FIG 5 shows that, any(
(sr,sc)t
)
T is “attracted” towards the unique EqPt.
• For game 3X3-2eq2sp FIG 10 shows that, any(
(sr,sc)t
)
T is “attracted” towards one of the two EqPts.
7Figure 10: Both EqPts of game 3X3-2eq2sp are “attractors”. Ten
pairs of random “strateg paths” are depicted.
Figure 11: The EqPt of game 3X3-1eq3sp is a “repellor”. Ten
pairs of random “strateg paths” are depicted, five of which are
started from closely near the true EqPt.
• For game 3X3-1eq3sp FIG 11 shows that, any(
(sr,sc)t
)
T is ”repelled” from the EqPt unless (sr,sc)0
is exactly the EqPt.
We also test the examples of n-person game by extending
Algorithm 1 from bivariate case to general multivariate case,
which can be better explained by the source code. And we ob-
serve the convergence or disconvergence of (St)T as with the
two-person games. FIG. 4 shows an example for the conver-
gence case. The computational complexity of this extended
algorithm is under O(n2gn) with n being the number of play-
ers and g=max{g1,g2, . . . ,gn}, meaning that it is polynomial
time when n is given.
V. EQPT APPROXIMATION ACCURACY
In last section, we observe that for some games se-
quence
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T seemingly converges towards EqPt, e.g.,
3X3-1eq1sp, 3X3-1eq2sp and 3X3-2eq2sp. Whereas for
games such as 3X3-1eq3sp, sequence
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T clearly
doesn’t converge at all; instead, it evolves into a perpetual
cyclic path away from EqPt. Roughly speaking, the conver-
gence or disconvergence of
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T affects the accuracy of
EqPt approximation. In this section, we will look into the ap-
proximation accuracy from two numerical perspectives. One
is to examine sequence
(
Rr,Rc)t
)
T since regret sum is a mea-
sure of approximation accuracy as discussed in Section III,
and the other one is to revisit the convergence of
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T
with metric. And we will show the connection between them.
First, by taking the 3×3 games in last section for exam-
ple, we have the following observations on their sequences(
(Rr,Rc)t
)
T plotted in FIG 12:
• As opposed to the presumption in Section III, regret
sum oftentimes doesn’t monotonically decrease. In-
stead, due to the inter-player influence from simulta-
neous strategy adjustment, regret sum fluctuates with
a decreasing tendency to reach new minimum. Game
3X3-1eq1sp barely has regret sum fluctuation, whereas
game 3X3-1eq3sp has intensive regret sum fluctuation.
• There is different degree of periodicity in regret sum
fluctuation for different games. Regret sum fluctuation
of game 3X3-1eq3sp exhibits strong periodicity and
yet weak decreasing tendency.
• The strong periodicity of regret sum sequence in game
3X3-1eq3sp, caused by the “repellor” EqPt, severely
undermines the accuracy of EqPt approximation.
• It is painfully slow for regret sum sequence to converge
towards zero in that regret sum decreases slowly at the
latter iterations, even for 3X3-1eq1sp. That is partly
because, as implied by Eq. (10), the ratio of payoff
increment to regret sum is getting smaller as iteration
goes.
Now it can be concluded that the inter-player influence
has a significant impact on the EqPt approximation accuracy
which otherwise could, given time, go on to perfection. In ad-
dition, FIG 13 shows the decreasing tendency of regret sum
for a five-person game.
Next, for the 3×3 games in last section, we will reexamine
their output sequences
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T by introducing a metric on
S. Generally, metric is necessary for the definitions of limit,
convergence and contractiveness of sequence (St)N. Follow-
ing the definitions in Section III, let us have a set S and a func-
tion Ψ : S→S of Eq. (11). From S we can derive a complete
metric space (S,d) with the metric function
8(a) Game 3X3-1eq1sp. (b) Game 3X3-1eq2sp.
(c) Game 3X3-2eq2sp. (d) Game 3X3-1eq3sp.
Figure 12: The output sequences
(
(Rr,Rc)t
)
T of Algorithm 1 for the four typical 3×3 games in last section.
Figure 13: The regret sum sequences of a five-person game with
players using two, three, four, five and six pure strategies.
d(X,Y) =
n
∑
i
‖xi−yi‖. (14)
Here xi and yi are the ith items of X∈S and Y∈S respec-
tively. Assume that Ψ : S→S is a contraction mapping on
metric space (S,d). That is, there exists a q∈(0,1) such that
for any X,Y∈S
d
(
Ψ(X),Ψ(Y)
)≤ qd(X,Y). (15)
Then by Banach fixed point theorem8, the function Ψ must
admit one unique fixed point S+∈S such that Ψ(S+)=S+ and
lim∞Ψt(S0)=S+ for any S0∈S. Apparently the contraction
condition of Eq. (15) is too strong for the convergence of
(St)N, since it precludes the sequence’s possible convergence
towards more than one EqPt, which is an important case of our
interest as shown in last section. Instead, let us consider the
contraction property of a specific sequence (St)N generated by
the given tuple [Ψ,S0]. From (St)N we can derive an infinite
real sequence (d˙t)N+ by defining
d˙t = d(St−1,St) = d
(
St−1,Ψ(St−1)
)
. (16)
And from sequence (d˙t)N+ we can further derive an infinite
real sequence (q˙t)N+ by defining
q˙t =
d˙t+1
d˙t
=
d(St ,St+1)
d(St−1,St)
=
d
(
Ψ(St−1),Ψ(St)
)
d
(
St−1,St
) . (17)
If (St)N is a contractive sequence ideally, i.e. 0<q˙t<1 for
any t∈N+, it must be an Cauchy sequence and converge to
an EqPt. That is, (St)N is a process of fixed point itera-
tion. Meanwhile, the sequence (d˙t)N+ must monotonically de-
crease and converge to zero. From the
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T sequences
generated by the 3×3 games of last section, we derive and de-
pict their (d˙t)T−1 and (q˙t)T−2 in FIG 14 to show that (d˙t)T−1
9(a) Game 3X3-1eq1sp. (b) Game 3X3-1eq2sp.
(c) Game 3X3-2eq2sp. (d) Game 3X3-1eq3sp.
Figure 14: The derived sequences (d˙t)T−1 in blue and (q˙t)T−2 in red for the four typical 3×3 games in last section.
sequences don’t monotonically decrease or converge to zero,
meaning that neither
(
(sr,sc)t
)
T sequences nor their Ψ func-
tions are contractive on (S,d). Nevertheless, by comparing
FIG 12 and FIG 14, we observe that there is strong coherence
among the sequences
(
(Rr,Rc)t
)
T , (d˙t)T−1 and (q˙t)T−2 of the
same game, as follows:
• As with regret sum, d˙ oftentimes fluctuates with a de-
creasing tendency to reach new minimum. d˙ of game
3X3-1eq1sp exhibits almost no fluctuation, whereas d˙
of game 3X3-1eq3sp exhibits strong periodicity.
• As with regret sum, in game 3X3-1eq3sp the strong
periodicity of (d˙t)T−1 could have hurt the accuracy of
EqPt approximation.
• q˙ fluctuates around 1 at the latter iterations, which ex-
plains why (d˙t)T−1 and regret sum sequence converge
at such a low speed.
Therefore, d˙ can be seen as an another overall measure of
EqPt approximation accuracy in addition to overall regret sum
and to improve accuracy is to reduce d˙, which in return jus-
tifies our definition of metric function in Eq. (14). Trivially,
there is an alternative metric function and applying it gives
us observations similar to those with Eq. (14). Here is the
alternative10:
d(X,Y) =
n
max
i
‖xi−yi‖. (18)
Now we can see the shortcomings of our theory: it relies
too much on the naked-eye observation. Given S0 andΨ, only
by observing the generated sequence (St)N and its derived se-
quences can we learn about their convergence or disconver-
gence, their periodicity, EqPts being “attractors” or “repel-
lors”, EqPt approximation accuracy, etc. And yet we fail to, in
the case of two-person game, provide a function if any – say
χ(A,B,rr,rc,S0) – to conveniently determine for [Ψ,S0]. Nor
can we provide a function χ(A,B,rr,rc) to determine whether
every S0∈S leads to a convergent sequence.
As a practical use of our theory, given a game and play-
ers’ initial strategy S0 we need to find out the optimal pa-
rameters for function Ψ in order to optimize EqPt approxi-
mation accuracy. That is, in the case of two-person game,
given payoff bimatrix (A,B) and initial (sr,sc)0, we need to
find out the optimal input [(A,B),(rr,rc),(sr,sc)0] for Algo-
rithm 1 to minimize overall regret sum. For that purpose, ob-
viously we can try different adjustment rates (rr,rc) in input as
in FIG 15. And notice that bimatrix (arA+br,acB+bc), where
(ar,ac)∈R2+ and (br,bc)∈R2, has the same EqPts as bimatrix
(A,B). Thus we can try different scale factors (ar,ac) in in-
put as shown in FIG 16. With parameters (rr,rc), (ar,ac) and
(br,bc) combined, there forms a search space for function Ψ,
10
which could be overwhelming when it comes to many-person
games.
Figure 15: The approximate EqPt’s regret sum (Rr,Rc)∗ of
Algorithm 1 for different adjustment rates in the case of game
3X3-1eq3sp. For simplicity we consider rr=rc for the input (rr,rc).
Figure 16: The approximate EqPt’s regret sum (Rr,Rc)∗ of
Algorithm 1 for different bimatrix scale factors in the case of game
3X3-1eq3sp. For simplicity we consider ar=ac and (br,bc)=(0,0)
for the input (arA+br,acB+bc). Note that the output (Rr,Rc)∗ is
“scaled back” with (a−1r ,a−1c ) for proper comparison.
VI. VARIANTS OF FUNCTION Ri,S
In this section, we will introduce two variants of Ri,S func-
tion for the purpose of generalization.
By applying on each component of the vector Ri,S(si) a gen-
eral function αi j : R≥0→R≥0, we have the first variant:
R¯i,S(si) =(
αi1◦ϕi1,S(si), . . . ,αi j◦ϕi j,S(si), . . . ,αigi◦ϕigi,S(si)
)
. (19)
Accordingly, we can write Eq. (9) to
〈R¯i(si),vi〉−〈s,vi〉
∣∣R¯i(si)∣∣
=
gi
∑
j
αi j◦ϕi j(si)
(
p¯i(pii j;S)− pi(si)
)
. (20)
Suppose that αi j(0)=0 for any i and j, then the summation
terms with p¯i(pii j;S)−pi(si)≤0 are eliminated from Eq. (20)
such that
gi
∑
j
αi j◦ϕi j(si)
(
p¯i(pii j;S)− pi(si)
)
=
gi
∑
j
αi j◦ϕi j(si)ϕi j(si) = 〈R¯i(si),Ri(si)〉. (21)
With Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) we can write Eq. (10) to
pi(s′i) = pi(si)+
〈R¯i(si),Ri(si)〉
r−1i +
∣∣R¯i(si)∣∣ ≥ pi(si). (22)
It is important to note that αi j(0)=0 ensures that “less prof-
itable than average” pure strategies are less used as with Ri,S.
Now, the new R¯i,S function not only increases payoff and thus
decreases regret sum for each player’s unilateral strategy ad-
justment, but also exposes a set of αi j functions to provide
more control on the process of fixed point iteration. For ex-
ample, as Eq. (19) implies, the set of αi j functions directly
controls the target of player i’s strategy adjustment by manip-
ulating the components of regret vector. In fact, Eq. (19) can
be seen as a generalization of the decision-making on strategy
target, while Eq. (3) is a special case with each αi j being iden-
tity function. In addition to functions αi j, we notice that Eq.
(22) still holds true if the constant ri is replaced with a general
function ri : S→R+, which allows more control on the adjust-
ment rate for the process of fixed point iteration. We believe
that functions αi j and ri could broaden the scope for the inter-
pretation of our theory in the real-life cases. With them, Eq.
(5) can be generalized to
ψi,S(si) =
si+ ri(S)R¯i,S(si)
1+ ri(S)
∣∣R¯i,S(si)∣∣ . (23)
Next we introduce the second variant of Ri,S to propose an-
other form of fixed point iteration beyond the non-cooperative
game. In no relevance to the concepts of game and regret, here
we consider a system of n agents whose states, alike strategies,
are defined to be points in simplex. Most distinctively, player
i’s Ri,S : Ii→Rgi≥0 of Eq. (3) is replaced with a general con-
tinuous Ri,S : Ii→Ii which maps agent i’s current state into a
target state. For every agent i, because simplex Ii is a com-
pact and convex set, according to fixed-point theorem8 given
any n-tuple S there must exist an s+i ∈Ii such that s+i =Ri,S(s+i ).
Meanwhile, ψi,S(si), now representing agent i’s state updating
over S, has the same geometrical interpretation as in FIG 1 ex-
cept for vector Ri,S(si) always being on simplex Ii. Then with∣∣Ri,S(si)∣∣=1 we can write Eq. (5) to
ψi,S(si) =
1
1+ ri
si+
ri
1+ ri
Ri,S(si). (24)
Here ri>0. Therefore, vector s′i=ψi(si) is a convex combi-
nation of vectors si and Ri(si); Ψ(S+)=S+ if and only if each
item s+i in S
+ satisfies Ri,S+(s+i )=s
+
i . And we have
11
‖s′i−Ri(si)‖=
∥∥∥ 1
1+ ri
si− 11+ riRi(si)
∥∥∥
=
1
1+ ri
‖si−Ri(si)‖< ‖si−Ri(si)‖. (25)
This inequality states that, each agent i’s state will get
closer, in terms of L2-norm distance, to its target state Ri(si)
if it unilaterally updates its state by Eq. (24). Given proper
function Ri and update rate ri, ‖si − Ri(si)‖ could be de-
creasing, even monotonically, along the sequence (St)N of
Eq. (12). Now as with the treatment in Section III let
us ideally assume that, lim∞‖si−Ri(si)‖(t)=0 or equivalently
lim∞
(
si−Ri(si)
)(t)
=0 for all agents even if they simultane-
ously update their states by Eq. (24). In that case, (St)N is
a process of fixed point iteration such that Ψ(S+)=S+ with
S+= lim∞St . In our study on the firing equilibrium of neural
network11,12, we proposed a special case of this form of fixed
point iteration where each agent’s state si∈Ii⊂R2.
We can compare this new fixed point iteration (FPI2 to refer
to) with the one in Section III (FPI1). Both FPI1 and FPI2 seek
out a fixed point S+ of function Ψ such that Ψ(S+)=S+. In
FPI1 such S+ is an equilibrium point of non-cooperative game
because
∣∣Ri,S+(s+i )∣∣=0 for all players, while in FPI2 such S+
is a “stationary” state of system because Ri,S+(s+i )=s
+
i for all
agents. In FPI1 each player adjusts its strategy towards vec-
tor Ri(si) to diminish it, while in FPI2 each agent updates its
strategy towards Ri(si) to become it. We believe that, as with
FPI1, the metric functions of Eq. (14) and Eq. (18) could be
applied to FPI2 for useful results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, to approximate a Nash equilibrium of non-
cooperative game, we propose and test a regret matching with
geometrical flavor. The results show that, if each and every
player continuously and “smoothly” suppresses the use of im-
mediately “unprofitable” pure strategies, the game will evolve
towards an equilibrium point. Our approach has its merit in its
simplicity and naturalness, suggesting that in the really world
the tendency towards Nash equilibrium could be more perva-
sive than expected. In natural selection “unprofitable” pure
strategies are immediately suppressed because the players us-
ing them have less offspring to pervade them. In markets the
players tend to use less in their mixed “portfolios” the pure
strategies they deem immediately unprofitable. And we can
imagine that in many cases the tendency could be too strong
to resist, so much so that its prevention could perhaps be more
a suitable topic, since most likely the equilibrium point is not
optimal against the non-equilibrium ones in terms of overall
payoff.
There are some other points worth mentioning. Our approx-
imation of equilibrium point, which all boils down to players’
reduction of regret sum, actually makes no assumption on the
existence of equilibrium point; the players need no notion of
equilibrium point. The players adjust their strategies nearly
independently with minimum information exchange among
them, which means that the approximation of equilibrium
point is effectively a distributed computation carried out by
the nature. The periodicity we observe in those sequences of
Section IV and Section V is an unexpected and yet truly inter-
esting pattern worth further investigations.
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